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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Paltseva, Elena
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); New Economic School
摘要：If individuals own the right to take any action that they please, and are free to contract about behaviour, will outcomes be efficient in all situations? That is, does the Coase theorem hold? We study this classic question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. But if part...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando E.; Lippi, Francesco; Paciello, Luigi
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Sassari; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study models where prices respond slowly to shocks because firms are rationally inattentive. Producers must pay a cost to observe the determinants of the current profit maximizing price, and hence observe them infrequently. To generate large real effects of monetary shocks in such a model the time between observations must be long and/or highly volatile. Previous work on rational inattentiveness has allowed for observation intervals that are either constant-but-long (e.g. Caballero, 1989 or...
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作者：Exley, Christine L.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk. A common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact. While this behaviour could be fully rationalized by standard economic models, this article shows that an additional mechanism is relevant: the use of risk as an excuse not to give. In a laboratory study, participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity. When their d...
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作者：Keister, Todd
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：Should policy makers be prevented from bailing out investors in the event of a crisis? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the policy maker will respond with fiscal transfers that partially cover intermediaries' losses. The anticipation of this bailout distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to become excessively illiquid and increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, how...
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作者：Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Coordination problems resembling weakest-link games with multiple Pareto ranked equilibria are ubiquitous in the economy and society. This makes it important to understand if and when agents are able to coordinate efficiently. Existing research on weakest-link games shows an overwhelming inability of people to coordinate on efficient equilibria, especially in larger groups. We show experimentally that freedom of neighbourhood choice overcomes the problem and leads to fully efficient coordinati...
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作者：Bordalo, Pedro; Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Harvard University
摘要：We present a model of market competition in which consumers' attention is drawn to the products' most salient attributes. Firms compete for consumer attention via their choices of quality and price. Strategic positioning of a product affects how all other products are perceived. With this attention externality, depending on the cost of producing quality some markets exhibit commoditized price salient equilibria, while others exhibit de-commoditized quality salient equilibria. When the costs of...
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作者：Stanton, Christopher T.; Thomas, Catherine
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Online markets for remote labour services allow workers and firms to contract with each other directly. Despite this, intermediaries-called outsourcing agencies-have emerged in these markets. This article shows that agencies signal to employers that inexperienced workers are high quality. Workers affiliated with an agency have substantially higher job-finding probabilities and wages at the beginning of their careers compared to similar workers without an agency affiliation. This advantage decl...
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作者：Iskhakov, Fedor; Rust, John; Schjerning, Bertel
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Georgetown University; University of Copenhagen
摘要：We define a class of dynamic Markovian games, directional dynamic games (DDG), where directionality is represented by a strategy-independent partial order on the state space. We show that many games are DDGs, yet none of the existing algorithms are guaranteed to find any Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of these games, much less all of them. We propose a fast and robust generalization of backward induction we call state recursion that operates on a decomposition of the overall DDG into a finit...
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作者：Dustmann, Christian; Glitz, Albrecht; Schoenberg, Uta; Bruecker, Herbert
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; University of London; University College London; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：This article derives novel testable implications of referral-based job search networks in which employees provide employers with information about potential new hires that they otherwise would not have. Using comprehensive matched employer-employee data covering the entire workforce in one large metropolitan labour market combined with unique survey data linked to administrative records, we provide evidence that workers earn higher wages and are less inclined to leave their firms if they have ...
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作者：Ishiguro, Shingo
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This article presents a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate how different contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements emerge endogenously and are linked dynamically with the process of economic development. Formal contracts are enforced by third-party institutions (courts), whereas relational contracts are self-enforcing agreements without third-party involvement. The novel feature of our model is that it demonstrates the co-evolution of these different enforceme...
