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作者：Gomes, Renato; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University
摘要：We develop a framework to study optimal sector-specific taxation, where each agent chooses an occupation by comparing her skill differential with the tax burden differential across sectors. Because skills are not perfectly transferable, the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem (according to which the second-best entails production efficiency) fails: social welfare can be increased by inducing some agents to join the sector in which their productivity is not the highest. At the optimum, income taxes balanc...
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作者：Chang, Briana
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This article develops a tractable model with two-dimensional asymmetric information in asset markets: sellers are privately informed about their asset quality and distress positions. Illiquidity arises endogenously and manifests itself through two distinct market outcomes. The first outcome features limited market participation, resulting in a dry-up in trading volume. The second outcome involves a large volume at a depressed price. Only in the latter outcome do distressed sellers engage in fi...
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作者：In, Younghwan; Wright, Julian
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：For many applications of signalling, senders rather than nature choose unobserved features such as their private choices of quality, capacity, investment, contract, or price, along with other actions that are (partially) observed by receivers. Despite the large number of different applications, these games have not been studied in any systematic way. We identify and study a general class of such games, which we call endogenous signalling games. These games normally suffer from a plethora of eq...
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作者：Andreasen, Martin M.; Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus; Rubio-Ramirez, Juan F.
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Emory University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：This article studies the pruned state-space system for higher-order perturbation approximations to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We show the stability of the pruned approximation up to third order and provide closed-form expressions for first and second unconditional moments and impulse response functions. Our results introduce generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation and impulse-response matching for DSGE models approximated up to third order and provide a founda...
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作者：Armenter, Roc
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：A monetary authority can be committed to pursuing an inflation, price-level, or nominal-GDP target, yet systematically fail to achieve the prescribed goal. Constrained by the zero lower bound on the policy rate, the monetary authority is unable to implement its objectives when private sector expectations stray far enough from the target. Low-inflation expectations become self-fulfilling, resulting in an additional Markov equilibrium in which the monetary authority falls short of the nominal ta...
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作者：Dubois, Pierre; Griffith, Rachel; O'Connell, Martin
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Manchester
摘要：There are growing calls to restrict advertising of junk foods. Whether such a move will improve diet quality will depend on how advertising shifts consumer demands and how firms respond. We study an important and typical junk food market-the potato chips market. We exploit consumer level exposure to adverts to estimate demand, allowing advertising to potentially shift the weight consumers place on product healthiness, tilt demand curves, have dynamic effects and spillover effects across brands...
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作者：Cisternas, Gonzalo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I study a class of continuous-time games of learning and imperfect monitoring. A long-run player and a market share a common prior about the initial value of a Gaussian hidden state, and learn about its subsequent values by observing a noisy public signal. The long-run player can nevertheless control the evolution of this signal, and thus affect the market's belief. The public signal has an additive structure, and noise is Brownian. I derive conditions for an ordinary differential equation to ...
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作者：Best, Michael Carlos; Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen
作者单位：Columbia University; Princeton University
摘要：We investigate housing market responses to transaction taxes using administrative data on all property transactions in the U.K. from 2004 to 2012 combined with quasi-experimental variation from tax notches and tax stimulus. We present two main findings. First, transaction taxes are highly distortionary across a range of margins, causing large distortions to the price, volume, and timing of property transactions. Secondly, temporary transaction tax cuts are an enormously effective form of fisca...
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作者：Fagereng, Andreas; Guiso, Luigi; Pistaferri, Luigi
作者单位：Statistics Norway; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; Statistics Norway; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Assessing the importance of uninsurable wage risk for individual financial choices faces two challenges. First, the identification of the marginal effect requires a measure of at least one component of risk that cannot be diversified or avoided. Moreover, measures of uninsurable wage risk must vary over time to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. Secondly, evaluating the economic significance of risk requires knowledge of the size of all the wage risk actually faced. Existing estimates are pro...
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作者：Kyle, Albert S.; Obizhaeva, Anna A.; Wang, Yajun
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; New Economic School
摘要：We describe a symmetric continuous-time model of trading among relatively overconfident, oligopolistic informed traders with exponential utility. Traders agree to disagree about the precisions of their continuous flows of Gaussian private information. The price depends on a trader's inventory (permanent price impact) and the derivative of a trader's inventory (temporary price impact). More disagreement makes the market more liquid; without enough disagreement, there is no trade. Target invento...
