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作者：Crockett, Sean; Duffy, John; Izhakian, Yehuda
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We implement a dynamic asset pricing experiment in the spirit of Lucas (1978) with storable assets and non-storable cash. In the first treatment, we impose diminishing marginal returns to cash to incentivize consumption smoothing across periods. We find that subjects use the asset to smooth consumption, although the asset trades at a discount relative to the risk-neutral fundamental price. This under-pricing is a departure from the asset price bubbles observed in the large experimental asset p...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Halevy, Yoram
作者单位：Boston University; University of Toronto
摘要：Many decisions are made in environments where outcomes are determined by the realization of multiple random events. A decision maker may be uncertain how these events are related. We identify and experimentally substantiate behaviour that intuitively reflects a lack of confidence in their joint distribution. Our findings suggest a dimension of ambiguity which is different from that in the classical distinction between risk and Knightian uncertainty.
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作者：Williams, Noah
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This article illustrates and characterizes how adaptive learning can lead to recurrent large fluctuations. Learning models have typically focused on the convergence of beliefs towards an equilibrium. However in stochastic environments, there may be rare but recurrent episodes where shocks cause beliefs to escape from the equilibrium, generating large movements in observed outcomes. I characterize the escape dynamics by drawing on the theory of large deviations, developing new results which mak...
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作者：Brugemann, Bjorn; Gautier, Pieter; Menzio, Guido
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study two wage bargaining games between a firm and multiple workers. We revisit the bargaining game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel. We show that, in the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, the gains from trade captured by workers who bargain earlier with the firm are larger than those captured by workers who bargain later, as well as larger than those captured by the firm. The resulting equilibrium payoffs are different from those reported in Stole and Zwiebel as they are not the Shapley val...
