-
作者：Leshno, Jacob D.; Lo, Irene
作者单位：University of Chicago; Stanford University
摘要：This article develops a tractable theoretical framework for the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism for school choice that allows quantifying welfare and optimizing policy decisions. We compute welfare for TTC and Deferred Acceptance (DA) under different priority structures and find that the choice of priorities can have larger welfare implications than the choice of mechanism. We solve for the welfare-maximizing distributions of school quality for parametrized economies and find that optimal i...
-
作者：Mueller-Smith, Michael; Schnepel, Kevin T.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Simon Fraser University
摘要：This article provides the first causal estimates on the popular, cost-saving practice of diversion in the criminal justice system, an intervention that provides offenders with a second chance to avoid a criminal record. We exploit two natural experiments in Harris County, Texas where first-time felony defendants faced abrupt changes in the probability of diversion. Using administrative data and regression discontinuity methods, we find robust evidence across both experiments that diversion cut...
-
作者：Eichenbaum, M. S.; Johannsen, B. K.; Rebelo, S. T.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Northwestern University
摘要：This article studies how the monetary policy regime affects the relative importance of nominal exchange rates and inflation rates in shaping the response of real exchange rates to shocks. We document two facts about inflation-targeting countries. First, the current real exchange rate predicts future changes in the nominal exchange rate. Second, the real exchange rate is a poor predictor of future inflation rates. We estimate a medium-size, open-economy DSGE model that accounts quantitatively f...
-
作者：Ambrus, Attila; Elliott, Matt
作者单位：Duke University; University of Cambridge
摘要：This article investigates stable and efficient networks in the context of risk sharing, when it is costly to establish and maintain relationships that facilitate risk sharing. We find a novel trade-off between efficiency and equality: the most stable efficient networks also generate the most inequality. We then suppose that individuals can be split into groups, assuming that incomes across groups are less correlated than within a group but relationships across groups are more costly to form. T...
-
作者：Fanelli, Sebastian; Straub, Ludwig
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study a real small open economy with two key ingredients (1) partial segmentation of home and foreign bond markets and (2) a pecuniary externality that makes the real exchange rate excessively volatile in response to capital flows. Partial segmentation implies that, by intervening in the bond markets, the central bank can affect the exchange rate and the spread between home- and foreign-bond yields. Such interventions allow the central bank to address the pecuniary externality, but they are...
-
作者：Battiston, Diego; Vidal, Jordi Blanes, I; Kirchmaier, Tom
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：Communication is integral to organizations and yet field evidence on the relation between communication and worker productivity remains scarce. We argue that a core role of communication is to transmit information that helps co-workers do their job better. We build a simple model in which workers choose the amount of communication by trading off this benefit against the time cost incurred by the sender, and use it to derive a set of empirical predictions. We then exploit a natural experiment i...
-
作者：Catonini, Emiliano
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：In dynamic games, players may observe a deviation from a pre-play, possibly incomplete, non-binding agreement before the game is over. The attempt to rationalize the deviation may lead players to revise their beliefs about the deviator's behaviour in the continuation of the game. This instance of forward induction reasoning is based on interactive beliefs about not just rationality, but also the compliance with the agreement itself. I study the effects of such rationalization on the self-enfor...
-
作者：Donovan, Kevin
-
作者：Hess, Simon; Jaimovich, Dany; Schuendeln, Matthias
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; Universidad de Talca
摘要：This article investigates the effects of development projects on economic networks. To this end, we study the impact that a randomly allocated Community-Driven Development program in The Gambia has on economic interactions within rural villages. The program provides an exogenous source of variation to village-level stocks of productive capital and to village-wide collective activities. Based on detailed data on economic and social networks, we find a significant reduction of transfers in these...
-
作者：Larsen, Bradley J.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This study empirically quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical ex-ante efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty and demonstrated that it falls short of ex-post efficiency, but little is known about how well bargaining performs in practice. Using about 265,000 sequences of a game of alternating-offer bargaining following an ascending auc...
