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作者：Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie; Uribe, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article establishes the existence of multiple equilibria in infinite-horizon open economy models in which the value of tradable and non-tradable endowments serves as collateral. In this environment, the economy displays self-fulfilling financial crises in which pessimistic views about the value of collateral induce agents to deleverage. Under plausible calibrations, there exist equilibria with underborrowing. This result stands in contrast to the overborrowing result stressed in the relat...
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作者：Cook, Cody; Diamond, Rebecca; Hall, Jonathan, V; List, John A.; Oyer, Paul
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Uber Technologies, Inc.; University of Chicago; Australian National University
摘要：The growth of the gig economy generatesworker flexibility that, some have speculated, will favour women. We explore this by examining labour supply choices and earnings among more than a million rideshare drivers on Uber in the U.S. We document a roughly 7% gender earnings gap amongst drivers. We showthat this gap can be entirely attributed to three factors: experience on the platform (learning-by-doing), preferences and constraints over where to work (driven largely by where drivers live and,...
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作者：McKay, Alisdair; Reis, Ricardo
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Should the generosity of unemployment benefits and the progressivity of income taxes depend on the presence of business cycles? This paper proposes a tractable model where there is a role for social insurance against uninsurable shocks to income and unemployment, as well as business cycles that are inefficient due to the presence of matching frictions and nominal rigidities. We derive an augmented Baily-Chetty formula showing that the optimal generosity of the social insurance system depends o...
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作者：Jorda, Oscar; Richter, Bjorn; Schularick, Moritz; Taylor, Alan M.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; University of California System; University of California Davis; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Bonn; University of California System; University of California Davis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：What is the relationship between bank capital, the risk of a financial crisis, and its severity? This article introduces the first comprehensive analysis of the long-run evolution of the capital structure of modern banking using newly constructed data for banks' balance sheets in 17 countries since 1870. In addition to establishing stylized facts on the changing funding mix of banks, we study the nexus between capital structure and financial instability. We find no association between higher c...
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作者：Levitt, Steven D.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Little is known about whether people make good choices when facing important decisions. This article reports on a large-scale randomized field experiment in which research subjects having difficulty making a decision flipped a coin to help determine their choice. For important decisions (e.g. quitting a job or ending a relationship), individuals who are told by the coin toss to make a change are more likely to make a change, more satisfied with their decisions, and happier six months later tha...
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作者：Piguillem, Facundo; Riboni, Alessandro
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as bargaining chips to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt-accumulation problem. We analyse various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g. government shutdown) maximize the opposition's b...
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作者：Hoffmann, Florian; Inderst, Roman; Opp, Marcus
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; KU Leuven; Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：This article characterizes optimal compensation contracts in principal-agent settings in which the consequences of the agent's action are only observed over time. The optimal timing of pay trades off the costs of deferred compensation arising from the agent's relative impatience and potential consumption smoothing needs against the benefit of exploiting additional informative signals. By capturing this information benefit of deferral in terms of the likelihood ratio dynamics, our characterizat...
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作者：Libgober, Jonathan; Mu, Xiaosheng
作者单位：University of Southern California; Princeton University
摘要：We introduce a robust approach to study dynamic monopoly pricing of a durable good in the face of buyer learning. A buyer receives information about her willingness-to-pay for the seller's product over time, and decides when to make a one-time purchase. The seller does not know how the buyer learns but commits to a pricing strategy to maximize profits against the worst-case information arrival process. We show that a constant price path delivers the robustly optimal profit, with profit and pri...
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作者：Clark, Daniel; Fudenberg, Drew; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching, overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state equilibria exist under general conditions on records. When the updating of a player's record can depend on the actions of both players in a match, any strictly individually rational action can be supported in a steady-state equilibrium. When record updates can depend only on a player's own actions, fewer actions can be suppo...
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作者：Dovis, Alessandro; Kirpalani, Rishabh
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This article studies the optimal design of rules in a dynamic model when there is a time inconsistency problem and uncertainty about whether the policy maker can commit to follow the rule ex post. The policy maker can either be a commitment type, which can always commit to follow rules, or an optimizing type, which sequentially decides whether to follow rules or not. This type is unobservable to private agents, who learn about it through the actions of the policy maker. Higher beliefs that the...
