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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers have the option to cheat their buyers, and buyers decide whether to repurchase from different sellers. We model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and study repeated games in such networks. Endowing sellers with incomplete knowledge of the network, we derive conditions that determine whether a network is consistent with cooperation between every buyer and seller that are connected. Three network fe...
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作者：Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Meier, Stephan
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swarthmore College; Columbia University
摘要：Economists are increasingly interested in how group membership affects individual behavior. The standard method assigns individuals to minimal groups, i.e. arbitrary labels, in a lab. But real groups often involve social interactions leading to social ties between group members. Our experiments compare randomly assigned minimal groups to randomly assigned groups involving real social interactions. While adding social ties leads to qualitatively similar, although stronger, in-group favoritism i...
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作者：Andreoni, James; Mylovanov, Tymofiy
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：People often see the same evidence but draw opposite conclusions, becoming polarized over time. More surprisingly, disagreements persist even when they are commonly known. We derive a model and present an experiment showing that opinions can diverge when one-dimensional opinions are formed from two-dimensional information. When subjects are given sufficient information to reach agreement, however, disagreement persists. Subjects discount information when it is filtered through the actions of o...
