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作者：Mookherjee, Dilip; Prina, Silvia; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Boston University; University System of Ohio; Case Western Reserve University; New York University
摘要：Theories based on partial equilibrium reasoning alone cannot explain the widespread negative cross-sectional correlation between parental wages and fertility, without restrictive assumptions on preferences and childcare costs. We argue that incorporating a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of returns to human capital can help explain observed empirical patterns. Other by-products of this theory include explanations for intergenerational mobility without stochastic shocks, connections betwee...
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作者：Robson, Arthur J.; Szentes, Balazs; Iantchev, Emil
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Syracuse University
摘要：We consider the evolutionary basis of time discounting with intergen-erational transfers. We show that the notion of reproductive value from biology provides the utility criterion for a parent to optimize the allocation of resources between transfers to offspring and to promote her own survival. This optimization has a natural dynamic programming formulation. We show that younger individuals may well be too impatient, but older individuals too patient in accordance with observations. We compar...
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作者：Vossler, Christian A.; Doyon, Maurice; Rondeau, Daniel
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; Laval University; University of Victoria
摘要：This paper explores methodological issues surrounding the use of discrete choice experiments to elicit values for public goods. We develop an explicit game theoretic model of individual decisions, providing conditions under which surveys with a single binary choice question, or sequence of binary choice questions, are incentive-compatible. We complement the theory with a framed field experiment, with treatments that span the spectrum from incentive-compatible, financially binding decisions to ...
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作者：Burke, Jeremy M.; Taylor, Curtis R.; Wagman, Liad
作者单位：RAND Corporation; Duke University; Illinois Institute of Technology
摘要：How do price commitments impact the amount of information firms acquire about potential customers? We examine this question in the context of a competitive market where firms search for information that may disqualify applicants. Contracts are incomplete because the amount of information acquired cannot be observed. Despite competition, we find that firms search for too much information in equilibrium. If price discrimination is prohibited, members of high-risk groups suffer disproportionately...
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作者：Anufriev, Mikhail; Hommes, Cars
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Amsterdam
摘要：In recent learning to forecast experiments (Hommes et al. 2005), three different patterns in aggregate price behavior have been observed: slow monotonic convergence, permanent oscillations, and dampened fluctuations. We show that a simple model of individual learning can explain these different aggregate outcomes within the same experimental setting. The key idea is evolutionary selection among heterogeneous expectation rules, driven by their relative performance. The out-of-sample predictive ...
