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作者：Dilme, Francesc; Li, Fei
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We study the role of dropout risk in dynamic signaling. A seller privately knows the quality of an indivisible good and decides when to trade. In each period, he may draw a dropout shock that forces him to trade immediately. To avoid costly delay, the seller with a low-quality good voluntarily pools with early dropouts, implying that the expected quality of the good increases over time. We characterize the time-varying equilibrium trading dynamics. It is demonstrated that the maximum equilibri...
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作者：Boik, Andre
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Local television stations are platforms in a two-sided market connecting advertisers and viewers. This paper explicitly examines the effect that important intermediaries (such as cable, telephone, and satellite distributors) may have on a platform's pricing behavior in a two-sided market. I find that stations raise their fees to cable distributors because stations prefer that viewers access their content through satellite distributors with whom they do not compete in the local advertising mark...
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作者：Bidner, Chris; Roger, Guillaume; Moses, Jessica
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; University of Sydney; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
摘要：We demonstrate how search frictions have important yet subtle implications for participation in a skilled labor market by studying a model in which agents invest in skill prior to searching for coworkers. Search frictions induce the existence of acceptance-constrained equilibria, whereby matching concerns-as opposed to investment costs-dissuade the marginal agent from investing and participating in the skilled matching market. Such equilibria are robust, relevant, and have comparative static p...
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作者：Clarke, Daniel J.
作者单位：The World Bank
摘要：Rational demand for index insurance products is shown to be fundamentally different to that for indemnity insurance products due to the presence of basis risk. In particular, optimal demand is zero for infinitely risk-averse individuals, and is nonmonotonic in risk aversion, wealth, and price. For a given belief, upper bounds are derived for the optimal demand from risk-averse and decreasing absolute risk-averse decision makers. A simple ratio for monitoring basis risk is presented and applied...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond; Murooka, Takeshi
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Central European University; University of Munich
摘要：We analyze innovation incentives when firms can invest either in increasing the product's value (value-increasing innovation) or in increasing the hidden prices they collect from naive consumers (exploitative innovation). We show that if firms cannot return all profits from hidden prices by lowering transparent prices, innovation incentives are often stronger for exploitative than for value-increasing innovations, and are strong even for non-appropriable innovations. These results help explain...
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作者：Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria exist where the manager discriminates in favor of the employee whom the employees expect to be favored. The manager, who has no taste for discrimination, discriminates in order to avoid demotivating the fav...
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作者：Cosar, A. Kerem; Fajgelbaum, Pablo D.
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We introduce an internal geography to the canonical model of international trade driven by comparative advantages to study the regional effects of external economic integration. The model features a dual-economy structure, in which locations near international gates specialize in export-oriented sectors while more distant locations do not trade with the rest of the world. The theory rationalizes patterns of specialization, employment, and relative incomes observed in developing countries that ...
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作者：Mueller-Frank, Manuel; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a sequential social learning model where agents privately acquire information by costly search. Search costs of agents are private, and are independently and identically distributed. We show that asymptotic learning occurs if and only if search costs are not bounded away from zero. We explicitly characterize equilibria for the case of two actions, and show that the probability of late moving agents taking the suboptimal action vanishes at a linear rate. Social welfare converges to the...
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作者：Salant, Yuval; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study the efficient allocation of a divisible asset when reallocation is costly. Two players initially divide an asset between them. At the time of this initial division the players' valuations for the asset are uncertain. After the uncertainty resolves, costly reallocation may take place. We first establish that the surplus associated with efficient reallocation monotonically increases or decreases in the concentration of the initial division for a wide range of cost specifications. We the...
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作者：Chen, Heng; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Crises, such as revolutions and currency attacks, rarely occur; but when they do they typically arrive in waves. The rarity of crises is an important contagion mechanism in a multiple-country dynamic global game model. When players are uncertain about the true model of the world, observing a rare success elsewhere can substantially change their expectations concerning the payoffs from attacking or defending the regime. Such dramatic revisions in beliefs, amplified by strategic complementarity ...
