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作者：HALIASSOS, M; BERTAUT, CC
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：We investigate why 75% of United States households do not hold stocks despite the equity premium and predictions of expected-utility models. The question is relevant for privatisation, asset pricing, and tax progressivity issues. We show that risk aversion Pcr se, heterogeneity of beliefs, habit persistence, time non-separability, and quantity constraints on borrowing do not account for the phenomenon. A wedge between borrowing and lending rates, and minimum-investment requirements are plausib...
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作者：MCDERMOTT, MC
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作者：MARSH, IW
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作者：TAKLA, L
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作者：BOROOAH, VK
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作者：YOSHA, O
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：In October 1983, following a stock market crash, the Israeli government became the owner of most of the banking system in the country. The government is now getting ready to privatise the banks. Using a simple model of imperfect competition between multi-product banks, the paper evaluates two proposals which have been raised in this context: spinning off entire divisions versus splitting the banks into smaller banks. The degree of substitutability between banking products (e.g. short-and long-...
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作者：JONES, R; NEWMAN, G
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper develops a search-theoretic approach to optimal growth where agents anticipate continuing technology advance. When agents require an adaptive search investment to 'match with' any new technology, but when this learning is depreciated at the inception of the next, we show that an economy will sustain either an equilibrium with frequent advances, coupled with inefficient matching, or one with exactly the opposite characteristics. The cyclical implication is chat the immediate effect o...
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作者：MOOKHERJEE, D; PNG, IPL
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inefficient way of encouraging the inspector to moni...
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作者：MCDERMOTT, MC
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作者：SALANTI, A
