CORRUPTIBLE LAW ENFORCERS - HOW SHOULD THEY BE COMPENSATED

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: MOOKHERJEE, D; PNG, IPL
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.2307/2235324
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 145-159
• 关键词: public production; optimal taxation; tax-reform; incentives; BRIBERY; PRIVATE; AGENCY

摘要

We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inefficient way of encouraging the inspector to monitor; society should wipe out corruption.