作者：Armantier, Olivier; Boly, Amadou
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：A prospect theory model combining loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity predicts that the link between incentives framing and effort is ambiguous: small penalties yield higher effort, but isomorphic contracts with large penalties decrease effort. We conduct two experiments (a framed field and a conventional lab experiment) in which economically equivalent contracts are framed as menus of either (i) bonuses, (ii) penalties, or (iii) bonuses and penalties. The experimental results confirm th...
作者：Hummel, Patrick; Knight, Brian
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Brown University
摘要：Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front-runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front-runner advantage is small, but sequential electio...
