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作者：Burdett, Kenneth; Dong, Mei; Sun, Ling; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Melbourne; Brock University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article integrates search-based models of marriage and money. We think about households as organizations, the way Coase thinks about firms, as alternatives to markets that become more attractive when transactions costs increase. In the model, individuals consume market- and home-produced goods, and home production is facilitated by marriage. Market frictions, including taxes, search, and bargaining problems, increase the marriage propensity. The inflation tax encourages marriage because b...
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作者：Miessi Sanches, Fabio A.; Junior Silva, Daniel; Srisuma, Sorawoot
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo; University of Warwick; University of Surrey
摘要：Estimation of dynamic games is known to be a numerically challenging task. A common form of the payoff functions employed in practice takes the linear-in-parameter specification. We show a least squares estimator taking a familiar OLS/GLS expression is available in such a case. Our proposed estimator has a closed form. It can be computed without any numerical optimization and always minimizes the least squares objective function. We specify the optimally weighted GLS estimator that is efficien...
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作者：Allen, Jason; Chapman, James; Echenique, Federico; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：Bank of Canada; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Using detailed transactions-level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct p...
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作者：Ju, Heng; Tan, Guofu
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University of Southern California
摘要：We develop models of bilateral oligopoly with traffic exchanges to study the competition and regulatory policies in the international telephone markets. Under the requirement of uniform settlement rates, the proportional return rule (PRR) inflates the rates and hence neutralizes PRR's effect on calling prices. Retail competition and PRR increase net settlement payments. Market efficiency is improved when there are multiple channels for traffic exchanges. Using a panel of 47 countries that exch...
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作者：Giacomini, Raffaella; Rossi, Barbara
作者单位：University of London; University College London; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI)
摘要：The goal of this article is to develop formal tests to evaluate the relative in-sample performance of two competing, misspecified, nonnested models in the presence of possible data instability. Compared to previous approaches to model selection, which are based on measures of global performance, we focus on the local relative performance of the models. We propose tests that are based on different measures of local performance and that correspond to different null and alternative hypotheses. Th...
