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作者：Sieg, Holger
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作者：Kawaura, Akihiko; La Croix, Sumner
作者单位：Doshisha University; University of Hawaii System
摘要：Teams in Japan's two professional baseball leagues began to add foreign players in the early 1950s, with the average number per team reaching 5.79 in 2004. This was primarily because foreign hitters outperformed Japanese hitters. Hazard analysis shows that a poorly performing team was more likely to hire its first Caucasian and African American players earlier than a successful team. Econometric analysis of team use of foreign players over 45 seasons (1960-2004) shows that losing Central Leagu...
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作者：Citanna, Alessandro; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：Yeshiva University; Columbia University
摘要：We decentralize incentive efficient allocations in large adverse selection economies by introducing a competitive market for mechanisms, that is, for menus of contracts. Facing a budget constraint, informed individuals purchase (lottery) tickets to enter mechanisms, whereas firms sell tickets and supply slots at mechanisms at given prices. Beyond optimization, market clearing, and rational expectations, an equilibrium requires that firms cannot favorably change, or cut, prices. An equilibrium ...
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作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study contests with private information and identical contestants, where contestants' efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities. The designer's revenue depends on the quality of the output, and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality. We characterize the equilibrium behavior, outcomes, and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory (where the reward is contestant-dependent) contests. We derive conditions under which the designer...
