作者：Kovrijnykh, Natalia; Livshits, Igor
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her endowment, and a lender uses random contracts to screen different types of borrowers. In equilibrium, some borrowers choose not to repay and thus become delinquent. The lender renegotiates with some delinquent borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, delinquency leads to bank...
作者：Vial, Bernardita; Zurita, Felipe
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：This article analyzes entry-exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge, within a rational-expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations. The analysis focuses on the class of name-switching reputational equilibria, in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants' reputation. The main technical result is the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium within this class...
