ENTRANTS' REPUTATION AND INDUSTRY DYNAMICS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vial, Bernardita; Zurita, Felipe
• 署名单位: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12226
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 529-559
• 关键词: Firm Dynamics; equilibrium; selection; MODEL; COMPETITION; survival; turnover; MARKETS; entry; names

摘要

This article analyzes entry-exit decisions in a market where reputation determines the price that firms may charge, within a rational-expectation model of competition in a nonatomic market under heterogeneous reputations. The analysis focuses on the class of name-switching reputational equilibria, in which a firm discards its name if and only if its reputation falls below the entrants' reputation. The main technical result is the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium within this class, in which the entrants' reputation is endogenous. The resulting industry dynamics is largely on agreement with the findings in the empirical literature.