作者：Decarolis, Francesco
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：This article contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions (ABAs), in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the ABA is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for...
作者：Holden, Steinar; Natvik, Gisle James; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：University of Oslo; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk. By influencing rational creditors, ratings affect sovereigns' probability of default, which in turn affects ratings. Our analysis reveals a pro-cyclical impact of credit rating: In equilibrium the presence of a rating agency increases default risk when it is high and decreases default risk when it is low.
