作者：HAMILTON, G
摘要：Historians argue that in late eighteenth-century North America, apprentices often ran away from their masters, Masters' inability to write enforceable contracts, the argument goes, sparked the decline of traditional apprenticeships. This article addresses the issue of enforcement. I analyze an apprentice's incentive to run away and the role of enforcement with detailed archival evidence from Montreal. These data cast doubt on the claim that masters were unable to construct enforceable contract...
作者：LEVENSTEIN, M
摘要：This article uses the records of the Dow Chemical Company to analyze the role of distributors in facilitating collusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It compares collusion in three closely related markets: salt, bromine, and bleach. Where national distributors with well-established reputations had facilitated the entry of small producers into integrated markets, distributors could also facilitate collusion. Mass-producing entrants, like Dow, joined collusive distributio...
