ENFORCEMENT IN APPRENTICESHIP CONTRACTS - WERE RUNAWAYS A SERIOUS PROBLEM - EVIDENCE FROM MONTREAL

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: HAMILTON, G
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700041632
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 551-574
• 关键词: UNITED-STATES

摘要

Historians argue that in late eighteenth-century North America, apprentices often ran away from their masters, Masters' inability to write enforceable contracts, the argument goes, sparked the decline of traditional apprenticeships. This article addresses the issue of enforcement. I analyze an apprentice's incentive to run away and the role of enforcement with detailed archival evidence from Montreal. These data cast doubt on the claim that masters were unable to construct enforceable contracts and call into question the severity of a runaway problem.