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作者：Herguera, I; Kujal, P; Petrakis, E
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Complutense University of Madrid; University of Crete
摘要：In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms' quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohib...
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作者：Baldwin, RE
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Kohler, M
作者单位：Bank of England
摘要：This paper analyses coalition formation in monetary policy coordination games between n countries. We show that some but not all countries may join if the decision to be a member of the coalition is incentive-compatible for the individual country. Positive spillovers of the coalition formation process and the resulting free-rider problem limit the stable coalition size: since the coalition members are bound by the union's discipline, an outsider can successfully export inflation without fearin...
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作者：Branstetter, LG; Feenstra, RC
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We view the political process in China as trading off the social benefits of increased trade and foreign direct investment against the losses incurred by state-owned enterprises due to such liberalization. A model drawing on Grossman and Helpman [Am. Econ. Rev. 84 (1994) 833; The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, MIT Press, Cambridge (1996) 199] is used to derive an empirically estimable government objective function. The key structural parameters - of thi...
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作者：Panagariya, A; Duttagupta, R
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; International Monetary Fund
摘要：In this paper we compare and contrast the political viability of bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA) Agreements in the presence of tariffs and quotas. Assuming that the government maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and producer profits, we show that the political viability of FTAs varies according to whether trade restrictions take the form of tariffs or quotas. A key result is that whereas an FTA is unambiguously rejected by one of the countries under a tariff, it may be endorsed by both trading...
