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作者：SILVA, ECD; KAHN, CM
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper examines the problem of costly exclusion of individuals from a public good. Previous analyses of exclusion have treated it as solely a question of technologies; in our analysis exclusion depends on technology and incentives. In this paper providers of the good design a mechanism to provide an optimal level of deterrence to free riders. If individuals are heterogeneous optimal deterrence may allow some free riders. We examine the effect of costs of exclusion on the Samuelson conditio...
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作者：FORTIN, B; TRUCHON, M; BEAUSEJOUR, L
摘要：Using a simulation model for a small open economy (Quebec 1986), various Negative Income Tax (NIT) and workfare schemes are compared from the point of view of efficiency and equity. The main finding is that there exist workfare schemes that are superior both to the Quebec regime of 1986, and to a NIT characterized by a 100 percent implicit tax rate. However, these workfare schemes are dominated by some NIT programs. This suggests that it may be necessary to have work requirements that vary acr...
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作者：BALLARD, CL; MEDEMA, SG
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver
摘要：Using 1983 data, we develop a 19-sector computational general equilibrium model, incorporating producer producer externalities and producer-consumer externalities. Simulation results indicate that when additional government expenditure is financed by Pigouvian taxes, the marginal cost of public funds is substantially below one. Labor, sales, and output taxes also affect the output of the polluting industries, and thus have indirect Pigouvian effects which tend to reduce the associated marginal...
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作者：SHARKEY, WW; SIBLEY, DS
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：In this paper we characterize the Pareto-optimal set of non-linear pricing schedules when non-negative weights are assigned to each customer type. Our analysis first compares general non-linear tariff schedules and sets of self-selecting two-part tariffs, when there are two customer types and the cost function is linear. We then derive optimal sets of two-part tariffs for arbitrary numbers of customer types and general cost functions. We also consider the sustainability of non-linear pricing s...
