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作者：Coto-Martínez, J
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; University of Greenwich
摘要：In this paper we consider a macroeconomic model in which public capital is a productive input and there is monopolistic competition in the product market. We analyze the effects of a permanent variation in public capital investment both in the short and in the long run. Finally, we show that the optimal provision of public capital under imperfect competition is higher than that associated with the first-best policy. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Gasparini, LC; Pinto, SA
作者单位：West Virginia University; National University of La Plata
摘要：This paper examines the argument for public provision of certain private goods, like education and health, based oil equality of opportunity by studying the utility possibility frontier of a society in which there is a concerti for the distribution of these goods. A given quality of education or health services call be consumed for free in the public sector, but people can opt-out and purchase their desired quality levels in the private sector. Some of the conclusions are: (i) a pure cash tran...
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作者：Cremer, Helmuth; Gahvari, Firouz
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Universite de Toulouse
摘要：This paper posits a two-stage game in tax regime and tax rates to study the property of second-best emission and output taxes in a two-country world with an atmospheric externality. It shows that (i) either the destination-destination or the origin-origin tax regime may constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game; (ii) either regime may Pareto-dominate the other;. (iii) it is possible to have a prisoner's dilemma game where the origin-origin regime Pareto-dominates but the cho...
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作者：Panteghini, Paolo M.
作者单位：University of Brescia
摘要：This article studies the characteristics of a S-based tax system under default risk. In particular we show that its neutrality properties depend on whether debt is protected or unprotected. In the former case, this system is neutral. In the latter case, where default timing is optimally chosen by shareholders, the S-based system is neutral with respect to real decisions only if the firm's and the lender's tax rate are equal. However, the shareholders' decision to default is always distorted. (...
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作者：Mankiw, N. Gregory; Weinzierl, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：This paper uses the neoclassical growth model to examine the extent to which a tax cut pays for itself through higher economic growth. The model yields simple expressions for the steady-state feedback effect of a tax cut. The feedback is surprisingly large: for standard parameter values, half of a capital tax cut is self-financing. The paper considers various generalizations of the basic model, including elastic labor supply, general production technologies, departures from infinite horizons, ...
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作者：Dal Bó, E
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A fundamental problem for government is how to combine commitment to certain policies with the flexibility required to adjust them when needed. Rogoff (1985) [Rogoff, K., 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, Q. J. Econ. 100(4) 1169-1189] showed that a way to strike the right balance is to appoint an optimally conservative policy-maker. In real life, however, policy-makers also have power over decisions where optimal plans are time-consistent, so delegating...
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作者：Foster, Gigi
作者单位：University of South Australia
摘要：Using a new administrative panel data set from the University of Maryland, this paper explores conventional peer effects and the effects of socially proximate peers at a large public university where some students are randomly assigned to housing. Results show that there is little evidence of robust residential peer effects on undergraduate performance. The impact of socially proximate peers' characteristics on student achievement is then examined using an instrumental variables technique. Res...
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作者：Glaeser, EL; Saks, RE
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of governme...
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作者：Olken, BA
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines the degree to which the corruption in developing countries may impair the ability of governments to redistribute wealth among their citizens. Specifically, I examine a large antipoverty program in Indonesia that distributed subsidized rice to poor households. I estimate the extent of corruption in the program by comparing administrative data on the amount of rice distributed with survey data on the amount actually received by households. The central estimates suggest that, ...
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作者：Kessing, SG; Konrad, KA
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：Restrictions on working hours are more important in countries with a large welfare state. We show that this empirical observation is consistent with the strategic effects of such restrictions in a welfare state in the context of optimal direct taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971) [Mirrlees, J.A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38, 175-208]. Our results also apply to non-welfarist states that have income redistribution, but not ...
