-
作者：WALLER, CJ
摘要：In this paper, a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two-party political system. The major results of the paper are: 1) The party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy. 2) Changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president's term in office to the first period of the president's term will lead to more partisan moneta...
-
作者：BATINA, RG
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：It is shown that the government's social security benefit policy may be time-inconsistent when a worker's future benefit depends on his labor earnings history. When the future benefit is tied to current labor supply, the benefit will distort the worker's labor supply decision ex ante of retirement, but not ex post. Any excess burden associated with the government's benefit policy is taken into account in the open loop policy game, but is ignored in the closed loop game. This will generally imp...
-
作者：COLEMAN, WJ; GILLES, C; LABADIE, P
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Duke University
摘要：We extend recent models of liquidity to study how a systematic relationship between monetary shocks and output affects the average real short-term interest rate.
-
作者：BALL, L
摘要：This paper presents a model of monetary policy in which a rise in inflation raises uncertainty about future inflation. When actual and expected inflation are low, there is a consensus that the monetary authority will try to keep them low. When inflation is high, policymakers face a dilemma: they would like to disinflate, but fear the recession that would result. The public does not know the tastes of future policymakers, and thus does not know whether disinflation will occur.
