WHY DOES HIGH INFLATION RAISE INFLATION UNCERTAINTY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BALL, L
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/0304-3932(92)90032-W
发表日期：
1992
页码：
371-388
关键词：
摘要：
This paper presents a model of monetary policy in which a rise in inflation raises uncertainty about future inflation. When actual and expected inflation are low, there is a consensus that the monetary authority will try to keep them low. When inflation is high, policymakers face a dilemma: they would like to disinflate, but fear the recession that would result. The public does not know the tastes of future policymakers, and thus does not know whether disinflation will occur.
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