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作者：Esteller-More, Alejandro; Galmarini, Umberto; Rizzo, Leonzio
作者单位：University of Insubria; University of Barcelona; University of Ferrara
摘要：We consider a federation with two layers of government, in which Leviathan policy makers levy an excise tax on a consumption good that generates a negative externality and that is produced in an imperfectly competitive market. When both layers of government are allowed to tax, policy choices are affected also by vertical tax competition. In this setting, tax policy in general is not efficient. We then examine how special interest groups may influence tax policy by lobbying the policy makers. W...
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作者：De Fraja, Gianni; Valbonesi, Paola
作者单位：University of Padua; University of Leicester; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper compares the organisation of the university sector under unregulated private provision with the structure which would be chosen by a welfare maximising government. It studies a general equilibrium model where students attend university to earn higher incomes in the labour market, and universities teach them and carry out research. Each university chooses its tuition fee to maximise the amount of resources it can devote to research. Research bestows an externality on society. Governm...
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作者：Jaeger, David A.; Klor, Esteban F.; Miaari, Sami H.; Paserman, M. Daniele
作者单位：Boston University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; University of Cologne; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Ono Academic College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines how violence influences the political preferences of an aggrieved constituency that is purportedly represented by militant factions. Using longitudinal public opinion poll micro data of the Palestinian population linked to data on fatalities from the Second Intifada, we find that although local Israeli violence discourages Palestinians from supporting moderate political positions, this radicalization is fleeting, and vanishes completely within 90 days. We do, however, find ...
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作者：Johannesen, Niels
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper develops a model where firms can shift profits to tax havens by means of intra-firm loans and countries can protect themselves against profit shifting by taxing cross-border interest flows. The model considers two countries with a scope for welfare improving economic integration. The first-best tax system has two important characteristics: (i) the tax rate on interest flows to the other country is zero to ensure the optimal level of economic integration; (ii) the tax rate on interes...
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作者：Cotton, Christopher
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：We develop a game theoretic model of informational lobbying between two interest groups and a politician, in which the politician can require political contributions in exchange for access. The analysis considers three claims: (1) the rich have better access to politicians than less-wealthy groups, (2) this access advantage makes the rich better off and skews policy in their favor, and (3) contribution limits can reduce the rich group advantage and result in less-skewed policy. We show that th...
