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作者：Gavin, William T.; Kydland, Finn E.; Pakko, Michael R.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：This paper analyzes the interaction of inflation with the tax code and its contribution to aggregate fluctuations. We find significant effects operating through the tax on realized nominal capital gains. A tax on nominal bond income magnifies these effects. Our innovation is to combine monetary policy shocks with non-indexed taxes in a model where the central bank implements policy using an interest rate rule. Monetary policy had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 1...
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作者：Chatterjee, Satyajit; Corbae, Dean
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：The potential benefit of policies that eliminate a small likelihood of economic crises is calculated. An economic crisis is defined as an increase in unemployment of the magnitude observed during the Great Depression. For the U.S., the maximum likelihood estimate of entering a depression is found to be about once every 83 years. The welfare gain from setting this small probability to zero can range between 1% and 7% of annual consumption in perpetuity. For most estimates, more than half of the...
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作者：Kahn, James A.; Rich, Robert W.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：The acceleration of productivity after 1995 prompted a debate over whether the economy's underlying growth rate would remain high. In this paper, we draw on growth theory to identify variables other than productivity-namely consumption and labor compensation-to help estimate trend productivity growth. We treat that trend as a common factor with two regimes, high- and low-growth. Our analysis picks up striking evidence of a return in 1997 to the high-growth regime, nearly 25 years after a switc...
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作者：Pavoni, Nicola
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：The design of an optimal unemployment compensation scheme is analyzed, using a dynamic principal-agent relationship between a risk-neutral planner (the principal) and risk-averse workers (the agents), where the planner's inability to observe workers' job-search efforts creates a moral hazard problem. To design an implementable scheme, we require that each agent is guaranteed a minimum level of expected discounted utility, regardless of his past history. In contrast with previous studies, we fi...
