On optimal unemployment compensation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pavoni, Nicola
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.06.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1612-1630
• 关键词: Unemployment insurance; Recursive contracts; moral hazard; equity and social programs

摘要

The design of an optimal unemployment compensation scheme is analyzed, using a dynamic principal-agent relationship between a risk-neutral planner (the principal) and risk-averse workers (the agents), where the planner's inability to observe workers' job-search efforts creates a moral hazard problem. To design an implementable scheme, we require that each agent is guaranteed a minimum level of expected discounted utility, regardless of his past history. In contrast with previous studies, we find that the optimal contract is quite close to actual unemployment compensation schemes, both qualitatively and quantitatively. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.