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作者：Sleet, Christopher; Yeltekin, Sevin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper considers the political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ljungqvist, Lars; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; New York University
摘要：An incomplete-market life-cycle model with indivisible labor makes career lengths and human capital accumulation respond to labor tax rates and government supplied non-employment benefits. We compare aggregate and individual outcomes in this individualistic incomplete-market model with those in a comparable collectivist representative-family model with employment lotteries and complete-insurance markets. The incomplete- and complete-market structures assign leisure to different types of indivi...
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作者：Backus, David; Henriksen, Espen; Storesletten, Kjetil
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Oslo
摘要：Despite enormous growth in international capital flows, capital-output ratios continue to exhibit substantial heterogeneity across countries. We explore the possibility that taxes, particularly corporate taxes, are a significant source of this heterogeneity. The evidence is mixed. Tax rates computed from tax revenue are inversely correlated with capital-output ratios, as we might expect. However, effective tax rates constructed from official tax rates show little relation to capital-or to reve...
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作者：Grochulski, Borys
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
