Politically credible social insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sleet, Christopher; Yeltekin, Sevin
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.10.002
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 129-151
• 关键词: social insurance; credibility; voting

摘要

This paper considers the political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.