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作者：Bhattacharya, Sudipto; Guriev, Sergei
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; New Economic School
摘要：We develop a model of two-stage cumulative research and development (R&D), in which one research unit (RU) with an innovative idea bargains to license its nonverifiable interim knowledge exclusively to one of two competing development units (DU's) via one of two alternative modes: an open sale after patenting this knowledge, or a closed sale in which precluding further disclosure to a competing DU requires the RU to hold a stake in the licensed DU's postinvention revenues. Both modes lead to p...
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作者：Reiche, Sonje
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：In this paper we add to the foundations of incomplete contracting literature. We study the hold-up problem with ambivalent investment, where investment benefits the investing party if ex post the fight decision is undertaken but harms the investing party if the wrong decision is made. In this context, we show that the power of contracts to provide investment incentives depends on three factors: the commitment value of contracts, the amount of quasirents that the investing party can expect in t...
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作者：Moen, Espen R.; Rosen, Asa
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; Stockholm University
摘要：We analyze the optimal (efficiency) wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers' effort nor their match-specific productivity. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn creates unemployment. Nonetheless, the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits. We also show that more high-powered inc...
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作者：Gautier, Pieter A.; Teulings, Coen N.
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper shows that we can normalize job and worker characteristics so that, without frictions, there exists a linear relationship between wages on the one hand and worker and job type indices on the other. However, for five European countries and the United States we find strong evidence for a systematic concave relationship. An assignment model with search frictions provides a parsimonious explanation for our findings. This model yields two restrictions on the coefficients that fit the dat...
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作者：Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to repay the debt. These debt/labor contracts are easier to enforce in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly-for instance, because of stricter deportation policies-fewer immigrants default on debt. This...
