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作者:Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要:We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal: increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication ...
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作者:Coto-Martinez, Javier; Garriga, Carlos; Sanchez-Losada, Fernando
作者单位:City St Georges, University of London; University of Barcelona; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要:In this article we explore the proposition that, in economies with imperfect competitive markets, the optimal capital income tax is negative and the optimal tax on firms' profits is confiscatory. We show that if the total factor productivity as well as the number of firms or varieties are endogenous instead of fixed, then the optimal fiscal policy can lead to different results. The government faces a trade-off between the fixed costs that society pays for the introduction of a new firm and the...
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作者:Thesmar, David; Thoenig, Mathias
作者单位:University of Geneva; Paris School of Economics
摘要:This article presents a model where firms may endogenously externalize part of their production process. We start from the premise that adaptation to uncertainty cannot be contracted upon in the worker/employer relationship. Vertical separation then balances flexibility gains against hold-up costs of opportunistic behavior by outside contractors. In equilibrium, the degree of separation is shown to depend on the degree of product market competition, contractor's bargaining power, and the volat...
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作者:Kraay, Aart; Ventura, Jaume
摘要:Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers whereas poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. (1) Because new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich...
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作者:Nocke, Volker; Stahl, Konrad; Peitz, Martin
作者单位:University of Oxford; University of Mannheim
摘要:We develop a theoretical framework of trade on a platform on which buyers and sellers interact, and compare the impact of different platform ownership structures. If two-sided network effects are strong, monopoly ownership induces more trade than dispersed ownership and is therefore socially preferable. Independent of the strength of network effects, monopoly ownership dominates a club-like ownership structure where incumbent owners can exclude potential entrants. Under dispersed ownership, ve...