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作者：Jappelli, Tullio; Padula, Mario; Pistaferri, Luigi
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Stanford University
摘要：Recent models with liquidity constraints and impatience emphasize that consumers use savings to buffer income fluctuations. When wealth is below an optimal target, consumers try to increase their buffer stock of wealth by saving more. When it is above target, they increase consumption. This important implication of the buffer stock model of saving has not been subject to direct empirical testing. We derive from the model an appropriate theoretical restriction and test it using data on working-...
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作者：Goyal, Sanjeev; Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis; Konovalov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Groningen; University of Innsbruck
摘要：We develop a model of R&D collaboration in which individual firms carry out in-house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non-core activities with other firms. We develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which R&D investments in different projects of a firm are complementary. We show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models. We then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investme...
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作者：Guiso, Luigi; Paiella, Monica
作者单位：European University Institute; Parthenope University Naples
摘要：We use household survey data to construct a direct measure of absolute risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a risky security. We relate this measure to consumer's endowments and attributes and to measures of background risk and liquidity constraints. We find that risk aversion is a decreasing function of the endowment - thus rejecting CARA preferences. We estimate the elasticity of risk aversion to consumption at about 0.7, below the unitary value predicted...
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作者：Barr, Abigail; Genicot, Garance
作者单位：University of Oxford; Georgetown University
摘要：This paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique field experiment especially designed to test the effects of the level of commitment and information available to individuals when sharing risk. We find that limiting exogenously provided commitment is associated with less risk sharing, whereas limiting information on defections can be associated with more risk sharing. These results can be understood by distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, and by recognizing that s...
