Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hughes, Niall
• 署名单位: University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220665
• 发表日期: 2025-12
• 页码: 4292-4327
• 关键词: electoral competition; political competition; INFORMATION; platforms; aggregation; policies; votes

摘要

I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections. (JEL D71, D72, D81, D91)