Allocation Mechanisms with Mixture-Averse Preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dillenberger, David; Segal, Uzi
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Boston College
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240339
• 发表日期: 2025-12
• 页码: 4523-4547
• 关键词: PROSPECT-THEORY; RISK; lotteries; DECISION; utility; equity; uncertainty; assignment; EFFICIENCY; reduction

摘要

Consider an economy with equal amounts of N types of goods, to be allocated to agents with strict quasi-convex preferences over lotteries. We show that ex ante, all Pareto-efficient allocations give almost all agents lotteries over at most two outcomes. Our results provide a simple criterion showing that many popular allocation mechanisms are ex ante inefficient. For the case of identical preferences, we establish existence of an efficient solution where all lotteries used are equally attractive. Assuming the reduction axiom, social welfare deteriorates by first randomizing over these binary lotteries. Efficient ex ante equality is achieved if agents satisfy the compound-independence axiom. (JEL D44, D61, D82)