Tying with Network Effects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Whinston, Michael D.
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20240461
• 发表日期: 2026-01
• 页码: 332-374
• 关键词: Leverage

摘要

We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a quasi-installed base advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects. (JEL D41, D85, K21, L15, L40)