Downward Rigidity in the Wage for New Hires

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hazell, Jonathon; Taska, Bledi
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282; 1944-7981
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201793
• 发表日期: 2025-12
• 页码: 4183-4217
• 关键词: business-cycle; real wages; unemployment fluctuations; cyclicality; selection; BEHAVIOR; prices; cost

摘要

Wage rigidity is an important explanation for unemployment fluctuations. In benchmark models wages for new hires are key, but there is limited evidence on this margin. We use wages posted on vacancies, with job and establishment information, to measure the wage for new hires. We show that our measure of the wage for new hires is rigid downward and flexible upward, in two steps. First, wages change infrequently at the job level, and fall especially rarely. Second, wages do not respond to rises in unemployment, but respond strongly to falls in unemployment. Job information is crucial for detecting downward rigidity.