A learning approach to the governance of professionals. Field experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andersen, Simon Calmar; Guul, Thorbjorn Sejr
• 署名单位: Aarhus University; University of Southern Denmark
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1053-1858; 1477-9803
• DOI: 10.1093/jopart/muaf028
• 发表日期: 2026-01
• 页码: 51-70
• 关键词: Bayesian learning; performance management; field experiment; education; teachers; performance information; PUBLIC MANAGEMENT; bureaucracy; GOVERNMENT

摘要

Performance management is used by governments worldwide to incentivize professionals in schools and other public organizations. Yet, much research shows that these incentives may generate perverse dysfunctional effects. Based on a Bayesian model of learning, we propose that simply providing professional teachers with performance information-without changing their extrinsic incentives-may be enough to make them update their beliefs about their students and act accordingly. However, measuring performance may itself affect professionals' behavior, which makes it difficult to isolate the effect of providing performance information. We designed and preregistered a field experiment in which we can isolate the effect of making performance information available to teachers and study how it affects their posterior beliefs and behavior towards the students (N = 2028). The results confirm the primary hypothesis and therefore provide indications that the provision of information itself may be effective in the governance of public organizations.