Public Service Delegation and the Mechanisms of Blame Attribution: Evidence From a Survey Experiment on Public Service Failure

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Nowlan, Oscar
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0033-3352; 1540-6210
• DOI: 10.1111/puar.70173
• 发表日期: 2026-08-10
• 关键词: blame attribution; blame avoidance; causal and functional responsibility; public service delegation; causal mechanisms; sensitivity-analysis; performance; identification; satisfaction

摘要

A growing body of experimental public administration research examines how structural arrangements in public services, such as delegating service delivery to public or private actors, shape citizens' blame attributions for service failures. However, the mechanisms underlying these attributions are less well understood. This article investigates two mechanisms, focusing on the mediating roles of citizens' perceptions of politicians' causal responsibility (perceived control over service delivery) and functional responsibility (perceived duty to ensure service quality). A UK-based survey experiment on local waste collection failures tests these mechanisms using causal mediation analysis. The results show higher levels of delegation reduce blame primarily by lowering perceptions of politicians' control over service delivery. In contrast, there is no strong evidence of mediation through perceived duty, suggesting that role-based expectations of functional responsibility are more resistant to change. These findings provide new insight into how different public service delivery methods influence blame attribution for service performance.