Subtle Discrimination

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pikulina, Elena s.; Ferreira, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; University of London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; London School Economics & Political Science; European Corporate Governance Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082; 1540-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13506
• 发表日期: 2026-02
• 关键词: MUTUAL FUND FLOWS; racial-discrimination; affirmative-action; labor-markets; INFORMATION; contests; MODEL; performance; WORKPLACE; selection

摘要

We introduce the concept of subtle discrimination-biased acts that cannot be objectively ascertained as discriminatory. When candidates compete for promotions by investing in skills, firms' subtle biases induce discriminated candidates to overinvest when promotions are low-stakes (to distinguish themselves from favored candidates) but underinvest in high-stakes settings (anticipating low promotion probabilities). This asymmetry implies that subtle discrimination raises profits in low-productivity firms but lowers them in high-productivity firms. Although subtle biases are small, they generate large gaps in skills and promotion outcomes. We derive further predictions in contexts such as equity analysis, lending, fund flows, banking careers, and entrepreneurial finance.