Learning to Disclose: Disclosure Dynamics in the 1890s Streetcar Industry

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bourveau, Thomas; Breuer, Matthias; Stoumbos, Robert
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Goethe University Frankfurt; ESSEC Business School
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0893-9454; 1465-7368
• DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhaf033
• 发表日期: 2025-09
• 页码: 2602-2651
• 关键词: D82; D83; D91; L92; M41; N21; Financial disclosure; voluntary disclosure; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; capital-markets; INFORMATION; credibility; management; equilibrium; prices; MODEL

摘要

We study the influence of bounded rationality on companies' disclosure to investors in new industries. Using a historical example of a new industry, we document that several companies initially withheld their earnings, despite external capital needs and investor information demands. However, almost all these companies started disclosing shortly thereafter. Interpreted through the lens of a disclosure model featuring level-$ k $ thinking, these patterns suggest that limited strategic thinking of some companies contributed to the initial failure to disclose, while feedback and learning over time contributed to the quick convergence to an equilibrium of (almost) full disclosure in the new industry.