Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pulejo, Massimo; Querubin, Pablo
• 署名单位: Roma Tre University; Bocconi University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240383
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: organized-crime; electoral accountability; CORRUPTION; mafia; CONSEQUENCES; manipulation; selection; audits

摘要

What is the effect of politicians' wages on corruption in the presence of criminal groups that use both bribes and violence? With a regression discontinuity design and three distinct proxies for corruption, we show that better-paid Italian politicians are more likely to promote transparency and competition in procurement but also more likely to incur criminal attacks. The effects of wages, which subside after three years, are driven by changes in incumbents' behavior rather than improved selection. These findings show how higher wages may curb corruption, but also foster the use of violence as an alternative tool to influence policymaking. (JEL D72, D73, J31, K42)