Cross-State Strategic Voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dahl, Gordon B.; Engelberg, Joseph; Lu, Runjing; Mullins, William
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California San Diego; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Toronto; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7731
• DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240630
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: habit formation; turnout; voters; FRAUD; COSTS; LAWS

摘要

We estimate that 3.1 percent of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zip codes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states that automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote. (JEL D63, D72, K16)