The Origins and Control of Forest Fires in the Tropics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balboni, Clare; Burgess, Robin; Olken, Benjamin A.
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaf088
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: HEALTH CONSEQUENCES; Indonesia; deforestation; BORDERS; peat

摘要

Environmental externalities-uncompensated damages imposed on others-lie at the root of climate change, pollution, deforestation and biodiversity loss. Empirical evidence is limited, however, as to how externalities drive private decision making. We study one such behaviour, illegal tropical forest fires, using 15 years of daily satellite data covering over 107,000 fires across Indonesia. Weather-induced variation in fire spread risk and variation in who owns surrounding land allow us to identify how far externalities influence the decision to use fire. Relative to when all spread risks are internalized, we find that firms overuse fire when surrounded by unleased government lands where property rights are weak. In contrast, and consistent with the Coase Theorem, firms treat risks to nearby private concessions similarly to risks to their own land. Government sanctions, concentrated on fires spreading to populated areas, also deter fires, consistent with Pigouvian deterrence.