Institutional investors, tax havens, and multinational subsidiaries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choi, Nicole; Donker, Han; Fedenia, Mark; Nofsinger, John R.
• 署名单位: University of Wyoming; Central Washington University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Alaska System; University of Alaska Anchorage
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2506
• DOI: 10.1057/s41267-025-00827-6
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; large shareholders; OWNERSHIP; SEPARATION; avoidance

摘要

This study investigates how institutional investors approach multinational companies (MNCs) with ties to tax havens by analyzing their ownership patterns. Leveraging quarterly holdings data from over 15,000 investors spanning 90 countries and more than 20,000 MNCs, we uncover that institutional ownership is noticeably higher for firms incorporated in tax havens compared to those merely operating subsidiaries there. Investors are especially drawn to the tax rate differential between a firm's incorporation country and domicile country. Yet, our findings reveal that institutional investors do not overlook the importance of a robust governance framework. Institutional ownership is higher in firms in countries with stronger governance standards, suggesting a balancing of tax benefits against governance risks. We further differentiate between independent and pressure-sensitive institutional investors, reporting that independent institutions are particularly focused on maximizing tax efficiency and ensuring high governance quality, while pressure-sensitive investors exhibit less pronounced preferences. Our research highlights the nuanced trade-offs institutional investors must weigh when considering MNCs with tax haven exposure, emphasizing that both tax advantages and governance considerations play pivotal roles in shaping investment strategies. These insights deepen our understanding of global investment behavior and inform policy debates about the complex interplay between taxation, governance, and multinational corporate structure. Cette recherche examine comment les investisseurs institutionnels approchent des entreprises multinationales ayant des liens avec les paradis fiscaux en analysant leurs configurations de propri & eacute;t & eacute;. En exploitant des donn & eacute;es trimestrielles sur les portefeuilles de plus de 15000 investisseurs r & eacute;partis dans 90 pays et plus de 20000 entreprises multinationales, nous observons que la propri & eacute;t & eacute; institutionnelle est sensiblement plus & eacute;lev & eacute;e pour les entreprises incorpor & eacute;es dans des paradis fiscaux par rapport & agrave; celles qui n'y font qu'op & eacute;rer des filiales. Les investisseurs sont particuli & egrave;rement attir & eacute;s par la diff & eacute;rence de taux d'imposition entre le pays d'incorporation d'une entreprise et son pays de domiciliation. Cependant, nos r & eacute;sultats r & eacute;v & egrave;lent que les investisseurs institutionnels ne n & eacute;gligent pas l'importance d'un cadre de gouvernance solide. La propri & eacute;t & eacute; institutionnelle est plus & eacute;lev & eacute;e dans les entreprises situ & eacute;es dans des pays avec des normes de gouvernance plus strictes, ce qui sugg & egrave;re un & eacute;quilibre entre les avantages fiscaux et les risques li & eacute;s & agrave; la gouvernance. Nous diff & eacute;rencions & eacute;galement les investisseurs institutionnels ind & eacute;pendants de ceux sensibles aux pressions, en mettant en & eacute;vidence que les institutions ind & eacute;pendantes se concentrent particuli & egrave;rement sur l'optimisation de l'efficience fiscale et sur la garantie d'une gouvernance de haute qualit & eacute;, tandis que les investisseurs sensibles aux pressions montrent des pr & eacute;f & eacute;rences moins marqu & eacute;es. Notre recherche met en lumi & egrave;re les compromis nuanc & eacute;s que les investisseurs institutionnels doivent consid & eacute;rer lorsqu'ils examinent des entreprises multinationales expos & eacute;es aux paradis fiscaux, et souligne d'ailleurs que les avantages fiscaux et les consid & eacute;rations de gouvernance jouent tous deux un r & ocirc;le central dans l'& eacute;laboration des strat & eacute;gies d'investissement. Ces renseignements approfondissent notre compr & eacute;hension du comportement d'investissement mondial, et & eacute;clairent en outre les d & eacute;bats politiques sur l'interaction complexe entre la fiscalit & eacute;, la gouvernance et la structure des entreprises multinationales. Este estudio investiga c & oacute;mo los inversores institucionales se aproximan a las empresas multinacionales con v & iacute;nculos con para & iacute;sos fiscales, analizando sus patrones de propiedad accionaria. Empleando datos trimestrales de tenencias de m & aacute;s de 15.000 inversionistas en 90 pa & iacute;ses y m & aacute;s de 20.000 empresas multinacionales, descubrimos que la propiedad institucional es notablemente mayor en las empresas constituidas en para & iacute;sos fiscales en comparaci & oacute;n con aquellas que solo mantienen filiales all & iacute;. Los inversores muestran especial preferencia por la diferencia en las tasas impositivas entre el pa & iacute;s de constituci & oacute;n de una empresa y su pa & iacute;s de domicilio. Sin embargo, nuestros hallazgos revelan que los inversores institucionales no pasan por alto la importancia de un marco de gobernanza s & oacute;lido. La propiedad institucional es mayor en empresas domiciliadas en pa & iacute;ses con est & aacute;ndares de gobernanza m & aacute;s fuertes, lo que sugiere un equilibrio entre los beneficios fiscales y los riesgos de gobernanza. Adem & aacute;s, diferenciamos entre inversionistas institucionales independientes y aquellos dependientes (o sensibles a presi & oacute;n), encontrando que las instituciones independientes se centran particularmente en maximizar la eficiencia fiscal y garantizar una alta calidad de gobernanza, mientras que los inversionistas dependientes muestran preferencias menos marcadas. Nuestra investigaci & oacute;n destaca los matices de las compensaciones que los inversionistas dependientes deben considerar al evaluar empresas multinacionales con exposici & oacute;n a para & iacute;sos fiscales, enfatizando que tanto las ventajas fiscales como las consideraciones de gobernanza desempe & ntilde;an roles fundamentales en la configuraci & oacute;n de las estrategias de inversi & oacute;n. Estos hallazgos profundizan nuestra comprensi & oacute;n del comportamiento de inversi & oacute;n global e informan los debates pol & iacute;ticos sobre la compleja interacci & oacute;n entre fiscalidad, gobernanza y la estructura corporativa multinacional. Este estudo investiga como investidores institucionais abordam empresas multinacionais (MNCs) com v & iacute;nculos em para & iacute;sos fiscais, analisando seus padr & otilde;es de propriedade. Utilizando dados trimestrais de participa & ccedil;& otilde;es de mais de 15.000 investidores em 90 pa & iacute;ses e mais de 20.000 MNCs, descobrimos que a propriedade institucional & eacute; visivelmente maior para empresas incorporadas em para & iacute;sos fiscais em compara & ccedil;& atilde;o com aquelas que apenas operam subsidi & aacute;rias nesses locais. Investidores s & atilde;o especialmente atra & iacute;dos pela diferen & ccedil;a nas taxas de imposto entre o pa & iacute;s de incorpora & ccedil;& atilde;o de uma empresa e seu pa & iacute;s de domic & iacute;lio. Ainda, nossos resultados revelam que investidores institucionais n & atilde;o negligenciam a import & acirc;ncia de uma robusta estrutura de governan & ccedil;a. A propriedade institucional & eacute; maior em empresas localizadas em pa & iacute;ses com padr & otilde;es de governan & ccedil;a mais fortes, sugerindo um equil & iacute;brio entre benef & iacute;cios fiscais e riscos de governan & ccedil;a. Al & eacute;m disso, diferenciamos entre investidores institucionais independentes e aqueles sens & iacute;veis a press & otilde;es, relatando que institui & ccedil;& otilde;es independentes est & atilde;o particularmente focadas em maximizar a efici & ecirc;ncia fiscal e garantir alta qualidade de governan & ccedil;a, enquanto investidores sens & iacute;veis a press & otilde;es exibem prefer & ecirc;ncias menos pronunciadas. Nossa pesquisa destaca os sutis trade-offs que investidores institucionais devem considerar ao avaliar MNCs com exposi & ccedil;& atilde;o a para & iacute;sos fiscais, enfatizando que tanto vantagens fiscais quanto considera & ccedil;& otilde;es de governan & ccedil;a desempenham pap & eacute;is fundamentais na formula & ccedil;& atilde;o de estrat & eacute;gias de investimento. Esses insights aprofundam nossa compreens & atilde;o sobre o comportamento de investimento global e informam debates pol & iacute;ticos sobre a complexa intera & ccedil;& atilde;o entre tributa & ccedil;& atilde;o, governan & ccedil;a e estrutura corporativa multinacional. 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