Private Equity and Pay Gaps Inside the Firm

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fang, Lily; Goldman, Jim; Roulet, Alexandra
• 署名单位: INSEAD Business School; McGill University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-1082; 1540-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70043
• 发表日期: 2026-08
• 页码: 1805-1840
• 关键词: BUYOUTS; DISCRIMINATION; INEQUALITY; workers

摘要

Using two decades of French administrative data, we find that post-leveraged buyout (LBO), target firms reduce within-firm pay gaps while increasing profitability relative to control firms. Employee turnover drives the pay-gap reduction. In target and control firms alike, turnovers reduce average pay more at the top of the wage distribution than at the bottom because separated employees are paid more-new joiners less-than similar employees, especially among skilled employees. LBOs amplify this effect through increased turnover among managers. Post-buyout, p90/p10, gender, age, and managers/non-managers pay gaps decline by 3%, 9%, 21%, and 4% and the employee pool becomes younger.