'Til Dowry Do Us Part: Bargaining and Violence in Indian Families

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calvi, Rossella; Keskar, Ajinkya
• 署名单位: Rice University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01399
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: fertility; payments; inflation; women

摘要

We develop a noncooperative bargaining model with incomplete information linking dowry payments, domestic violence, resource allocation between a husband and a wife, and separation. Our model generates several predictions, which we test empirically using amendments to the Indian antidowry law as a natural experiment. We document a decline in women's bargaining power and separations and a surge in domestic violence following the amendments. These unintended effects are attenuated when social stigma against separation is low and, in some circumstances, when gains from marriage are high. Whenever possible, parents increase investment in their daughters' human capital to compensate for lower dowries.