Disentangling Reputation from Selection Effects in Markets with Informational Asymmetries: A Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alysandratos, Theodore; Georganas, Sotiris; Sutter, Matthias
• 署名单位: Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; City St Georges, University of London; University of Cologne; University of Innsbruck; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6535
• DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01451
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Credence goods; price-competition; Agency problems; ECONOMICS; trust; FRAUD

摘要

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanisms or because of reputational concerns of sellers. We show in a field experiment how to disentangle self-selection from reputation effects. Based on 476 taxi rides with four different types of taxis, we find strong evidence for reputation effects but little support for self-selection effects. We discuss policy implications of our findings.