Search Platforms: Big Data and Sponsored Positions

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Jungbauer, Thomas; Preuss, Marcel; Williams, Cole
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag002
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: consumer search; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; internet; price

摘要

We study a search platform that ranks firms' products across sponsored and organic positions, accounting for the incentives of both firms and consumers. To characterise an optimal ranking when the number of firms is large, we formulate a Mixing Principle for Consumer Search, adapting tools from the social learning literature. The platform assigns the products it deems best to sponsored positions and obfuscates the content of organic positions, subject to consumers' participation constraints. Obfuscation serves to maximise the platform's revenue from both sponsored-position auctions and commission fees. Our results allow us to analyse the welfare effects of sponsored positions.