Within-Firm Pay Inequality and Productivity

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Wallskog, Melanie; Bloom, Nicholas; Ohlmacher, Scott; Tello-Trillo, Cristina
• 署名单位: Duke University; Stanford University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueag020
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: UNITED-STATES; earnings inequality; wage inequality; family firm; ceo pay; performance; dispersion; rise; EMPLOYMENT; EVOLUTION

摘要

Using confidential Census data, we find that aggressive performance pay practices and productivity growth have combined to increase US inequality. Employees at more productive firms earn higher pay at all earnings levels; similarly, when a firm becomes more productive, pay increases across its workforce. Importantly, however, these pay-productivity relationships strengthen with seniority: within a firm, the pay-productivity elasticity more than doubles from the median-paid worker (0.04) to the top-paid worker (0.10). Moreover, this pay-performance relationship is particularly steep when there is more scope for performance-based pay, suggesting that the use of incentives can spur the growth of inequality following productivity growth.