Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gibson, Matthew D.
• 署名单位: Williams College; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf109
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: labor; monopsony; FIRMS; COMPETITION; MODEL

摘要

Adam Smith alleged that employers often secretly combine to reduce labour earnings. This paper examines an important case of such behaviour: no-poaching agreements through which information-technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. On average, the no-poaching agreements reduced salaries at colluding firms by 5.6%, consistent with considerable employer market power. Stock bonuses and job satisfaction were also negatively affected.