Manipulation and Selection in Unemployment Insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Citino, Luca; Russ, Kilian; Scrutinio, Vincenzo
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Bank of Italy; University of Bologna; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaf105
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: INFORMAL LABOR; benefits; duration; restrictions; LEVEL; cost; tax

摘要

In this paper, we study the selection patterns of individuals who manage to have their lay-off delayed around an age at lay-off threshold entitling them to four additional months of unemployment insurance, that is, manipulators. Using administrative data from Italy and bunching techniques, we document substantial manipulation around the cut-off and show that manipulators are selected on their long-term non-employment risk, but not on their moral hazard cost. Finally, we develop a sufficient statistics framework to assess how these findings affect optimal unemployment insurance duration in the presence of manipulation.